"When the hours, the nature of the work done, the physical conditions under which it's done, and the method by which it is remunerated are such as to cause great wear and tear of body or mind or both, and to lead to a low standard of living; when there has been a want of that leisure, rest and repose, which are among the necessities of efficiency; then the labour has been extravagant from the point of view of society at large" Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8 th Edition, P. 694 "Since scientific research has shown that alcoholic beverages slow down the human machine, and since the human machine is the most important machine in industry, we should expect the use of alcoholic beverages to slow down industry, and we should expect Prohibition, if enforced, to speed up industry"
Introduction
This paper sets out an alternative to the standard model of labour supply in which preferences are defined over goods and leisure and the slope of the budget constraint is given by the wage rate. In this, some (or all) of non market time is devoted to regenerating the productivity of labour through rest and relaxation rather than to leisure.
This allows us to explore how the composition of non market time can influence both labour supply responses to tax and wage rate changes, and the welfare cost of labour income or sales taxes, and we show that the differences relative to conventional models can be substantial.
In its simplest form non market time in the model is used solely to improve the efficiency or quality of labour (i.e. regeneration of labour productivity) rather than as leisure which directly yields utility. In this case, preferences are defined only over goods consumption. The allocation of time to non market activities is endogenously determined but this reflects income rather than utility maximization (which has only one argument; consumption). Choices between market and non market time allocation are undistorted by taxes in this case, since either form of time allocation generates a taxable income return (which, in turn, is used to buy consumption goods). This implies that there are two observationally equivalent simple models (traditional and sole regeneration models) each with endogenously determined market time allocation but with different implications for the distortionary costs of taxes. One dominates the literature, the other seems to be little discussed.
1
1 Also see, the paper by Biddle and Hammermesh (1990) which discusses sleep and the allocation of time which has a formulation of labour supply decisions related to our approach. A recent real business cycle piece by Fisher (2001) discusses cases where household capital affects market productivity and is also related to our discussion. Neither of these pieces discusses welfare effects of taxes. Widely cited pieces on
We also present a generalized model which blends both traditional and regeneration models into a combined model which includes both leisure in the utility function and regeneration possibilities from the use of non-leisure time. This model does not yield closed form solutions to either individual or household optimization problems, but we can work with it numerically solving the first order conditions for agent constrained utility maximizing behaviour. Changing share parameters on leisure (from smaller to larger) affects how of additional regeneration time influences labour efficiency and this allows us to move between the two extreme forms (traditional/pure regeneration) of the model.
If we treat only market time as observable and regeneration time as unobservable in this model, many parameterizations can be constructed each of which is consistent with the same base case data on time allocated to market labour supply and consumption of goods and the same point estimate of the (uncompensated) supply elasticity of market time (labour) with respect to the wage. Since regeneration time is not directly observable there is no test available to discriminate between alternative parameterizations generated in this way on any objective basis.
Thus, for observationally equivalent parameterizations of this model there are different welfare costs of the same tax when used in counterfactual mode with parameterizations each calibrated to different values of unobservable regeneration time.
For model parameterizations that are observationally equivalent in this sense, we are able to compute ranges of estimates of the welfare costs of the same tax (the ranges are 20 to 1 in some cases).
the welfare costs of labour income taxes using the traditional framework are Hausman (1984) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) . See also Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) , and Ham and Reilly (2002) .
We build a number of elaborations on this structure and approach to take the analysis further. We discuss two of these in detail in the text. One is where some market provided goods enter the regeneration process while others directly provide utility. In this elaboration, the usual presumption for a broadly based VAT breaks down and an added tax distortion between market provided goods and non market time enters the analysis. Here, the optimal tax on the market provided good entering regeneration is zero, but we can still evaluate the welfare costs of alternative configurations of tax rates across market goods. A second is a household model where time spent by one household member with others in the household regenerates both household members; effectively cross regeneration between the members of a household. For both of these model elaborations, we again compute a range of welfare cost estimates for the same tax across alternate combinations of data/elasticity admissible parameterizations.
We briefly discus empirical implementation of the regeneration approach and its wider implications both for empirical work on tax distortions of labour supply and for policy. The notion that there is non market activity regeneration seems intuitively plausible. It is a formulation of human behaviour with respect to labour supply seemingly closer to that used by psychologists in their studies of behavioural response than is the conventional economics approach. It is also an approach used in business literature on the management of human resources. We note that direct observation of regeneration time (i.e. separately from time devoted to pure leisure) appears to be difficult if not impossible at present. Time use survey data allows for no simple division of time between leisure and regeneration activities since all time allocation seemingly has both leisure (consumption) and regeneration (production) elements (sleeping, for instance).
Empirical implementation of regeneration based models for now may be hard to undertake, but these have been seemingly neglected in recent analytical work. In contrast, in the days of Marshall and Fisher (see quotes above) physical regeneration and degeneration of the human body entered the discussion of labour markets. The findings we report are disturbing since they seem to provide a plausible recasting of the analysis of the effects of taxes on labour supply yielding wide ranges of estimates of welfare costs and yield different implications for policy from standard analysis. Also, simple labour supply elasticities as conventionally estimated have a different interpretation under this approach, also with implications for econometric studies of labour supply.
The theme of the paper, therefore, is that a range of observationally equivalent (even if non operational) models are available for one of the classical issues in the public finance literature (the effects of taxes on labour supply) for which the welfare implications of policy interventions can be sharply different. Some of these models have no simple closed form solution and may seem unappealing to theorists if there are no general results or properties, but they are plausible, relatively simple to use, and can be worked with numerically. Importantly they seem to yield different results compared to those generated by models conventionally used in the literature and also appear to be unexplored. This raises the issue of why the discipline should adhere so strongly to simple analytic structures with closed form solutions giving strong results when closely related and seemingly equally (or even more) plausible models incorporating relatively 6 small departures from the simple structure (even if not yielding results in closed form) seem to change policy perceptions significantly.
The Neutrality of Taxes in a Simple Regeneration Model
In the conventional labour supply model a single individual or household maximizes utility defined over consumption, (C), and leisure, (L), subject to a budget constraint in which the wage rate, w, and the goods price, p, are given, i.e.
where L is the labour or time endowment.
A tax on labour supply at rate t distorts individual behaviour by changing the slope of the budget constraint, and problem (1) becomes,
where R is tax revenue recycled in lump sum form to the individual paying the tax. The tax distortion of labour supply decisions in this model has a welfare cost associated with it.
In a simple model in which all non market time is devoted to regeneration activities, and leisure does not enter preferences, an income tax has no effect on labour supply and has no welfare cost. Thus a model that is observationally equivalent to the standard labour supply model can be constructed with sharply different welfare implications. For simplicity we consider the case of a proportional income tax, but the same arguments apply if the income tax were non linear, or progressive.
Suppose that non market time is treated as devoted solely to regenerating the efficiency of labour, such that with more rest labour becomes more efficient 2 . While a decision by the individual or household on how much time to allocate to market labour supply must still be made, leisure will no longer enter the utility function if this is the only permissible use of non market time (our simplest regeneration case).
In this case, we can use the simple household optimization problem Our formulation implies income maximizing behaviour since only goods appear in the utility function. From (3) the first order condition is
or the wage obtained by supplying labour to the market equals the marginal return to regeneration time in the form of the higher wage times labour supply. In this event, a tax on labour supply applied to the budget constraint in (3) is neutral and has no impact since the individual simply income maximizes and both forms of time allocation (market and non-market labour supply) imply a taxable return. Thus, rest and relaxation improve labour efficiency and after some point diminishing returns to regeneration occur. In this model, the amount of time devoted to market labour supply will still be endogenously determined, but in the simple case above seemingly distortionary labour income taxes are non distorting.
This idea is discussed at some length in Marshall's Principles (1895) of the large benefits to the US economy from prohibition (Fisher (1926) ). Since these writings by these two eminent economists, the idea that non market time regenerates labour through rest and relaxation seems to have disappeared from the literature. One could argue that it is implicit in human capital literature, where time invested raises productivity, and these formulations are clearly closely related, although it should be noted that Marshall also discusses human capital (see P. 561, where the heading is "investment of capital by parents in children") and treats this discussion as entirely distinct from regeneration as do we. Here, there is no intertemporal structure, and time input every day is needed to maintain or enhance labour productivity. The more recent literature on efficiency wages also seems relevant to this discussion (see Akerloff and Yellen (1986) ), but typically in this literature there is only an exogenous distribution of efficiencies across workers, different to the formulation employed here of one individual with endogenously determined labour productivity.
Obtaining firm data on time devoted to regeneration is difficult in practice since time use survey data and other sources only report time devoted to particular activities (sleeping, eating, personal care, etc.) which may be interpreted as part leisure part regeneration. The point remains, however, that how we interpret time spent on non market activity affects model implications for policy. The approach suggested here appears to have been little discussed in contemporary literature whether in the simple form or in the more complex forms that follows.
A Generalized Model of Labour Supply and Taxes
The two models set out in section 2 can be combined to yield a generalized (or combined) model of labour supply and regeneration in which taxes still have distorting effects but the size of these depend both on leisure parameters in preferences and the strength of regeneration effects. We can construct parameterizations for this generalized model such that each is consistent with the same base case data and target (literature based point estimates of) labour supply elasticities. All these parameterizations meet a requirement of observational equivalence in the sense that they are each the result of calibration to the same base case data set and each have the same model labour supply elasticity generated as a point estimate around the base case model solution. But each parameterization yields different welfare cost estimates (and in some cases sharply so) for the same labour income or sales tax rate. Even though, in the absence of direct estimates of labour efficiency regeneration parameters, there seems to be no clear procedure to distinguish between these specifications on empirical grounds.
This generalized model has no closed form and so we use particular functional forms for preferences and the regeneration function and work with it numerically using GAMS 3 solution software. We assume preferences over goods and leisure are CES and
, where β and α are
is the hourly wage rate received by the individual and consists of two components; a base case wage rate w if labour quantity is not regenerated, and a regeneration component
β is a units term denominated in dollars per unit time. We have chosen this form for the regeneration function as one which is convenient and easy to work with numerically in the absence of any prior literature that we are aware of.
The optimizing problem for the household can be written as,
where γ and ρ are share and substitution elasticity parameters in CES preferences.
(5) can then be rewritten as the Legrangian
for which the first order conditions are
Given exogenous parameters γ, ρ, α, and β, this system of four equations can be solved numerically for the four unknowns C, L, L R , and λ. The hourly wage rate the
, is endogenously determined. Even though the individual is a price taker in market transactions, the endogeneity of the individual specific hourly wage reflects the endogeneity of L R . Unlike in the simple regeneration model set out above, if
we introduce a tax on labour income at rate t into this model, this tax will be distorting since leisure enters the preferences of the individual (or household).
The consumption possibilities (or budget) set for this model is no longer linear as implied by the budget constraint for the simple labour supply model. As drawn in Figure   1 , as leisure falls there is a segment of the budget set convex to the origin and then concave. This occurs since as more time is progressively devoted to regeneration, the resulting increase in the wage rate for the individual applies to a smaller amount of market time. As drawn, optimal behaviour involves the tangency point A. As ρ changes the curvature of the budget set changes, and beyond some critical value of ρ the budget set can become more steeply sloped than preferences in its portion which is convex to the origin resulting in problems in computation of optimal solutions. These problems are discussed below.
The equation system (7) does not yield a closed form solution, and hence wage elasticities of labour supply cannot be derived analytically. We can, however, , and use these two responses to calculate a wage elasticity of labour supply.
We use this approach to determine a point estimate of this elasticity for the model, i.e. the response in market labour supply with respect to the hourly wage rate. We compute this in the neighbourhood of the model solution implied by this equation system, even though the wage rate is endogenously determined and not exogenous in the elasticity calculation and the elasticity is not constant.
Relative to the simple optimizing structures used in most existing labour supply literature, this equation system will tend to generate lower values of labour supply elasticities for given values of ρ, because wage increases generate a positive response in time devoted to regeneration as well as increased market labour supply as leisure consumption falls. Current labour supply elasticity estimates only measure the market time response not the regeneration response, which appear in available data as a higher hourly wage rate. The interpretation of most existing estimates of labour supply elasticities thus need to be qualified if one accepts that regeneration activities do in fact occur.
Figure 1
The Budget Set and Optimal Behaviour in a Generalized
Model of Labour Supply and Regeneration
The equation system (7) can also be used to calculate the welfare costs of a labour income or sales tax using numerical simulation methods. We calibrate to a base case model solution and analyze a counterfactual solution under a tax change in similar ways to the applied equilibrium modelling literature (see Shoven and Whalley (1992) ), except that for now we do not use an empirically based model admissible base case data set for an actual economy. We do this both because time spent on regeneration is unobservable,
A
Consumption Goods 0 Leisure and also because our paper is expository rather than seeking to provide actual estimates of welfare costs of taxes for real economies. We construct a synthetic base case data set (in model admissible form) which we argue has loose empirical plausibility given the non observability of regeneration time.
Specifically, we take C, p, the market wage rate ( )
as observables and treat them as reflecting a base case optimization solution in the presence of a given labour income tax rate. w , as distinct from ( )
, the market wage, is unobservable since L R , α, and β are unknown. w is important in determining the role of regeneration in wage determination. We thus set values for w , ρ
and L R and in this way identify the equation system used in calibration. Since L R , time devoted to regeneration, is treated as unobservable, we set L R at some arbitrary specified value so as to allow us to calibrate the equation system (7) to the resulting synthetic base case data set and determine values for the model parameters γ, α, β, and λ. ρ is also unobservable but it can be iteratively adjusted to be consistent with values taken as estimates of labour supply elasticities (from a literature survey). We vary w across the different cases we report since there is no empirical basis to determine with any precision the proportion of the wage which should be attributed to regeneration activity. The resulting calibrated model parameter values determine a point estimate for the wage elasticity of labour supply in the neighbourhood of the base case model solution and we adjust our choice of ρ so as to yield our target value for the labour supply elasticity. We then compute a counterfactual model solution in the absence of the tax using a model parameterization generated in this way. This is in the range of second generation labour supply elasticity parameter values suggested by Killingsworth (1984) and is also consistent with more recent literature estimates discussed in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Ham and Reilly (2002) . The money metric measure of the welfare cost of a 10% income tax for this model specification is 0.116% of market labour income. To explore how large these differences in cost estimates can be we take different values for L R and recalibrate the model, iteratively adjusting ρ in each case so as to preserve the point estimate of the labour supply elasticity at its initial value at the base case solution. This yields us a range of alternative model parameterizations, each generated by different ρ and L R combinations and each observationally equivalent in the sense of being consistent with the same base case data and elasticity estimates. We then compute the welfare costs of a 10% labour income tax using each of these parameterizations. This yields ranges of welfare cost estimates for a series of observationally equivalent model parameterizations which we report below.
We begin by assuming (somewhat arbitrarily) that we have a target labour supply elasticity of 0.3 and use a base case value of the market wage of 2, the same base case
and L as in Table 1 , and assume an initial tax on labour income of 10%. We then vary both ρ and L R , and for each pair maintain observational equivalence in the sense set out above, and compute the welfare gain from removing the 10% tax for each (ρ , L R ) pair. We report the Hicksian Equivalent Variation as a percentage of base case labour income in Table 2 , both for this case and alternatives where w changes. This yields a range of L R and ρ values for a given w value for which we can compute welfare cost estimates for the same tax. In computing these ranges, when we increase ρ beyond some critical value the problems discussed above with regard to the convexity of the budget set arise and we stop computation at this point. This is in Hicksian equivalent variation as a % of labour income. Table 2 reports ranges of welfare cost estimates for the same 10% labour income tax for 6 cases, generated as set out above, and which only differ in the value used for w .
These cases imply ranges of welfare cost estimates which vary by a factor of up to 5 (case 1). These ranges behave differently across L R as w changes across cases. In some cases welfare costs behave monotonically in L R (e.g. rising in case 4, 5 and 6), but behaviour is non monotonic in others (cases 1, 2 and 3).
We view these results as suggestive of difficulties in both interpreting existing estimates of welfare costs of labour income taxes and labour supply elasticities, since what is usually accepted in most models as leisure might equally well be time devoted to regeneration. Estimates of both welfare costs on taxes and labour supply elasticities obtained from conventional models should thus seemingly be viewed as subject to some unknown variation due to regeneration effects.
For the case where w = 1 (column 3 of Table 2 ) we have used a grid over L R and again computed welfare costs to yield a welfare cost function over the L R value used in calibration. Figure 2 shows the behaviour of the welfare cost of the 10% labour income tax as L R varies in case 3 (where w is set equal to one). As L R approaches zero we asymptotically approach a conventional labour supply model. As both L R approaches 30 (no leisure consumption) and ρ approaches zero we move to a model in which there is no substitution in preferences between leisure and goods. Case 1 where L R = 27 is the maximum computable L R value in this case. 4 Results from these extreme cases are also set out in Table 3 , and all welfare cost estimates reported in Table 2 lie between these ranges. These results thus suggest that welfare cost estimates of taxes in a generalized model of labour supply that includes regeneration effects should be thought of as bounded from above by estimates from traditional no regeneration models and from below by zero (as implied by a pure regeneration model). Table 3 The In Figure 2 the welfare cost of the tax first increases then falls as the L R value used in calibration increases. This occurs because the generalized regeneration model incorporates two channels through which tax distortions of leisure and consumption operate rather than one as in the traditional simple model. These are directly on labour leisure decisions through changed leisure consumption, and indirectly through changed regeneration activity. Depending on the parameters in regeneration generated by calibration, tax distortions of the latter can be either more or less costly per dollar of revenue raised, and increasing the L R value used in calibration can increase or decrease the distortionary costs of taxes in some cases, as Figure 2 shows.
Results from Some Elaborations on the Generalized Leisure-Regeneration Model
We also work numerically with a range of elaborations on the generalized leisureregeneration model presented in the last section and for each of these we can similarly determine ranges of welfare cost estimates for the same tax from observationally equivalent model parameterizations. These cases serve to further highlight the ambiguities in predictions of the welfare effects of taxes that could be involved using 
Multiple Commodities
The first elaboration we consider involves the additional specification of a market supplied commodity as an input into regeneration. This commodity is assumed to be distinct from the consumption good which along with leisure once again directly yields utility. Thus, if there are two goods C, R; only one of the goods, C, directly provides utility and the other, R, combines with L R to yield regeneration services. In this case, the optimal tax structure across the two goods will have a zero tax rate on R, since on efficiency grounds the tax system should not distort between direct labour supply and regeneration activities as mechanisms for generating income. A broadly based sales or value added tax will thus no longer be optimal in this case.
Here, if regeneration involves a similar functional form with R and L R as Cobb Douglas inputs to regeneration, the individual optimization problem in (7) becomes
where P C and P R are now the prices of consumption and regeneration input goods.
This yields the Legrangian
for which the system of first order conditions can be written as
In contrast to the model set out in section 4 above, this now implies a system of five equations in five unknowns, C, R, L, L R , and λ. The exogenous parameters are now γ, ρ, α 1 , α 2 , and β. We can again calibrate this model in the presence of a labour income tax and then eliminate the labour income tax and compute the welfare cost of the tax. This tax will now be distorting both since leisure is in household preferences and two inputs, one market provided and the other non market provided, enter regeneration activities as inputs. An added tax distortion thus enters relative to the model used in the earlier section. Table 4 Ranges With this model we have performed similar experiments to those which we report on in section 4 above. We calibrate to a similar base case data set and labour supply elasticity estimate for assumed values of ρ, L R and R. We once again change the values of L R or R and iteratively change values of ρ so as to preserve a particular value of the point estimate of the labour supply elasticity in the neighbourhood of the base case. Table 4 reports estimates of ranges of welfare costs for the same 10% labour income tax using this elaborated version of the leisure-regeneration model. Here we can explore more combinations of variations in observationally equivalent parameterizations than in the case of the earlier model. We report two. In part A, we vary w (across columns) and L R (down rows) given a value for R (and hence C), and in part B we vary w and R (and hence C) given a value of L R . These results suggest considerably larger ranges of welfare cost estimates because of the added input distortion and its effects in distorting optimizing decisions between L and C. In case 4, where w = 0.5, ranges of estimated welfare costs exceed 20:1.
The optimal commodity tax structure for this version of the generalized model involves a zero tax rate on R, 5 but we can still use this model to compute the welfare costs of non uniform tax structures. We consider 3 cases involving different tax rates for R and C, each of which raises the same revenue in the base case. We report a range of welfare cost estimates for these 3 tax rate configurations, using similar ranges of adjustment in L R to those set out in Table 4 in each case. Results from these are reported in Table 5 . The varying ranges of estimates of welfare costs of taxes adds further ambiguity to any policy prescriptions based on welfare cost estimates for the income tax. 
A Household Based Regeneration Model
A second elaboration on the generalized leisure-regeneration model set out above considers regeneration within the household such that there are also cross effects between household members. In this case, the time devoted to regeneration by each household member also regenerates the labour (in efficiency terms) of the other household members. In this case, members of the household benefit positively from each other's company (negative effects could also be considered).
Thus, if regeneration activity for each household member involves a similar functional form to that used for L R in (7) and the household optimization problem involves a CES utility function defined over each individual's consumption of goods and leisure, optimization implies 
where the parameters α 2 , and α 4 reflect cross regeneration effects, and L R1 and L R2 are time devoted to regeneration activities by household members 1 and 2.
This yields the Legrangian, 
This yields a system of seven equations in seven unknowns, 
). For this model to be identified and useable in calibration mode identifying restrictions must be used. For simplicity, we have again assumed a value for ρ and then arbitrarily assumed that α's and β's are related in ratio form i.e. we assume a ratio of α 2 /α 4 , α 1 /α 3 and β 1 /β 2 . These identifying restrictions can be set as desired so as to yield stronger or weaker cross regeneration effects, but affect the ranges of welfare cost estimates we can generate.
This model form is more complex to work with numerically than the single agent formulations set out above since two elasticities are involved with cross effects. Thus changes in ρ affect the labour supply elasticity of the second household member and vice versa, and hence iterations on ρ must be made with corresponding variations in L R for both household members. Results using this model variant are presented in Table 6 using a variant with data similar to above but now for a two member household. 6 In this case we calibrate to two separate labour supply elasticities ignoring cross price elasticities, one for each household member, is involved (we assume these are both 0.3). These results show ranges of welfare cost estimates for a 10% labour income tax on both household members. These ranges are smaller than for Table 2 since cross effects between household members now enter. 
Concluding Remarks
We have presented a model of labour supply behaviour in which the allocation of time to non market activity reflects the use of time to regenerate labour productivity.
This can be in place of or as well as time which enters preferences directly as leisure. In a simple model in which all non market time goes to regeneration, households will income maximize and a labour income tax will have no impact on either welfare or labour supply even though labour supply is still endogenously determined. This is in contrast to the conventional model of labour supply in which utility is defined over goods and leisure and no regeneration occurs.
Between these two extremes is a generalization of both conventional leisure based and regeneration models where time is devoted both to leisure and to regeneration activity. This model has no closed form solution, but we can work with the resulting analytical structure numerically. We assume that time separately allocated to leisure and regeneration are unobservable and by varying weights on leisure and elasticities in CES preferences we generate a series of model parameterizations which are observationally equivalent in the sense that they all yield the same optimizing behaviour and all have the same point estimate for the labour supply elasticity in the neighbourhood of this model solution. Importantly, in combination they generate a range of welfare cost estimates for a given tax on labour income.
We consider two generalizations of the joint leisure/regeneration model. The first separately incorporates market provided consumption goods and goods which enter regeneration as inputs. The second incorporates regeneration activities by multiple members of a household into a household based model. Further ranges of welfare costs computed for those model variants. The same themes of results remain but quantitative dimensions of ranges change.
We are thus able to use seemingly plausible modifications and extensions to the traditional model of labour supply widely used to estimate labour supply elasticities to compute a range of welfare cost estimates for the same tax from observationally equivalent model specifications. While not yielding a closed form solution, the model we work with can nonetheless be used numerically and yields differing results from conventional models. There are a wide range of estimates of the welfare costs of the same tax for observationally equivalent specifications of the same model, in which calibration replicates both base case data and elasticity responses.
The response from an empirically trained economist to our analytics may be that there must surely be some way of discriminating among these estimates and thus narrow the range. The notion that a certain amount of non-labour time goes to regeneration rather than pure leisure seems appealing, but no data seems to exist which allows regeneration and leisure attributes of time use to be distinguished. Sleep, for instance, seemingly has both attributes. Eating food similarly likely has both. Time use survey data as currently collected yields no direct information as to how time is employed in regeneration, nor its effects on households and market productivity. Short of direct estimation of the labour productivity effects of time devoted to various regeneration type activities there seems to be no data that can be directly used to parameterise the model.
To us, a disturbing feature of our analysis seems to be that, while plausible, regeneration based labour supply models seem also to be non-operational on empirical grounds.
Snippets of data seemingly exist in the efficiency wage literature for developing countries, where daily caloric intake is related to labour productivity at performing various tasks. But for developed countries such information is, to our knowledge, unavailable and so for now we conclude that the regeneration labour supply model should be viewed as important but effectively non-operational.
Should a non operational model of labour supply yielding different implications for the welfare costs of taxes be rejected as lacking any empirical basis, and work in the area only concentrate on conventional implementable models? Our contention is that there is no basis for this position. The model we present seems plausible and interesting. It generalizes the existing literature dominant model. The reaction we have received to our work from other economists is that this model is both plausible and interesting. In implicit form it is in both Marshall and Fisher. The differences in results we report are striking. Our position, therefore, is that conventional estimates of welfare costs must be evaluated as reflecting a subjective judgement call that rejects all other plausible structures which could potentially yield sharply differing results. The basis for such rejection seems to us unclear and unproven relative to the scientific standards to which much of modern economics aspires.
